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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

ROBERT LEE HORNSBY
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 47279-2019
Bonneville County Case No.
CR-2018-7343

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

------------)
Has Robert Lee Hornsby failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
sentenced him to five years, with two years determinate for felony possession of a controlled
substance, and retained jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
Hornsby Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
Idaho Falls Police stopped a vehicle driven by Jennifer McCammon for not using a blinker.

(PSI, p.6 (citations to electronic file named "Confidential Documents Volume.pdf').) Robert Lee
Hornsby and Tanner D. Longhurst were passengers in the vehicle at that time.
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(PSI, p.6.)

Authorities notices a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle and asked McCammon,
Hornsby and Longhurst to exit the vehicle. (PSI, p.6.) Hornsby admitted that he had marijuana
on his person, and authorities retrieved that marijuana, along with a rolled up dollar bill that had a
white powder inside of it. (PSI, p.6.) The white powder was field tested and yielded a result of
presumptive positive for cocaine. (PSI, p.6.) Upon searching the vehicle, authorities found a bag
containing suspected methamphetamine and a pipe with white residue. (PSI, p.6.) Longhurst took
responsibility for the bag and its contents, and both Hornsby and Longhurst were arrested then
transported to the Bonneville County Jail. (PSI, p.6.)
The state charged Hornsby with felony possession of a controlled substance, cocaine,
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, and misdemeanor possession with
intent to use drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.39-40.) Hornsby pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, cocaine, and the state agreed to dismiss the two misdemeanor charges. (R.,
pp.83-86.) The district court sentenced Hornsby to five years, with two years determinant and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. I 04-105.)
On appeal, Hornsby argues that "his unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed,
is excessive," and that "the district court failed to place him on probation and denied his Rule 35
Motion without properly considering the mitigating factors." (Appellants brief, p.3.) Hornsby has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a unified sentence of five
years, with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction for felony possession of a controlled
substance, cocaine, and denying his Rule 35 Motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. Where a

sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear
2

abuse of discretion." State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, _ , 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution
applicable to a given case. Id. at_, 447 P.3d at 902. "A sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,
608,434 P.3d 209,212 (2019) (citation omitted).
The decision to place a defendant on probation is a matter within the sound discretion of
the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Reed, 163 Idaho 681,684,417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted). Rehabilitation
and public safety are dual goals of probation. State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d
461, 465 (2018). A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct.
App. 1982)).
"If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule

35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion." State
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In evaluating whether a lower court
abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks "whether the
trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
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specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856,863,421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

C.

Hornsby Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion
The sentence imposed is within the statutory limits of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(l). The district

court considered "protection of society, deterrence to [Hornsby] and to others, rehabilitation, and
also punishment for the wrongdoing." (Tr., p.26, Ls.19-21.) The district court stated that "the
punishment ... is the easy one to visit about and satisfy. And that is the incarceration that you've
already served thus far. 128 days is a significant amount of time." (Tr., p.26, Ls.22-25.) The
district court stated that the protection of society is important in this case because "this is an offense
that [it] believe[s] affects the community." (Tr., p.27, Ls.1-3.) The district court wanted "to deter
you from committing other offenses," and stated "that becomes more challenging with increasing
offenses. And, in [Hornsby's] case, [he's] had those four prior felonies." (Tr., p.27, Ls.4-7.) The
district court also considered rehabilitation and stated that it wants to see Hornsby succeed. (Tr.,
p.27. Ls.8-9.)
Hornsby contends that the mitigating factors-his age, acceptance of responsibility,
remorse, lack of prior drug convictions, family support and desire to support his family,
employment, and desire to go back to school-show "he would be an appropriate candidate for
probation and that the district court abused its discretion in twice denying him that chance."
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) Hornsby's argument does not show an abuse of discretion. Prior to
his plea of guilty, the district court ordered that Hornsby be released from the Bonneville County
Jail to the supervision of Pretrial Services. (R., p.36.) Five days following the order for release,
Wyoming charged Hornsby with unlawful possession of schedule one or two narcotic drug. (PSI,
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p.9.) While Hornsby is only twenty-five, he's acquired an extensive criminal history, consisting
of multiple felony charges. (PSI, pp.7-9.) Hornsby received five years on probation in two
separate criminal cases in Georgia. (PSI, pp.8-9.) Hornsby's Georgia probation officer, Officer
Hallisy, conducted a home visit on June 12, 2018, only to find that Hornsby's residence was
abandoned. (PSI, p.10.) Warrants were issued in Georgia, and remained active at the time of the
presentence investigation. (PSI, p.10.)
Hornsby argues that his acceptance into the Grace House rehabilitation program "shows
that rehabilitation is both possible and likely ifhe were given probation." (Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The district court considered his "Grace House availability" and "potential employment," but
ultimately determined that "given the prior convictions that are on [his] history, [Hornsby will] be
benefited by some of the programs that will be available to [him] during the retained jurisdiction."
(Tr., p.40, Ls.12-20.)
Hornsby' s criminal history, failure on previous probations in Georgia, and additional
charges he received in Wyoming, show that the sentence imposed was reasonable, and that he is
not a good candidate for probation.

Hornsby's prior felonies show that treatment while

incarcerated is a reasonable sentence, and his failures on previous probations show that community
treatment is not a suitable deterrence, or rehabilitation method for Hornsby. The drug charges he
received in Wyoming after being released on pretrial supervision shows that Hornsby does not
accept responsibility, or hold remorse for his actions in the instant offense. Hornsby has failed to
show that a lesser sentence than that imposed was the only reasonable option. He's failed to show
that he is a good candidate for probation, and he has failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion by denying his Rule 3 5 motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 7th day of April, 2020.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

ZACHAR! S. HALLETT
Paralegal
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